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Athletic Policy, Passive Well-Being: 
Defending Freedom in the Capability Approach 
 
1. Introduction 
 
If we accept that ‘we are all egalitarians now’, then the central remaining question for 
theorists of distributive justice is – in what sense should people be equal? Or, as 
Amartya Sen famously put it in his 1979 Tanner Lecture, if our aim is equality, then 
‘equality of what’? Sen’s answer was that we should be equal in our capabilities, or 
substantive opportunities, as opposed to other theories that advocated equality of 
resources or welfare. G.A. Cohen has advanced an influential critique of the answer that 
Sen, and other capability theorists, have provided to this question. Cohen (1993; 1994) 
suggests that capability theorists are wrong to focus on freedom or capability to 
function, and ignore the value of functionings achieved without the exercise of freedom.  
 
The crux of Cohen’s argument is, simply, that capability theorists take individuals’ well-
being to consist in the capabilities available to them. He contends that by focussing on 
capabilities – and so the freedom to control one’s life – capability theorists ignore 
passively-achieved benefits, and provide an excessively ‘athletic’ account of well-being. 
He maintains that, on the contrary, our well-being does not depend on the world 
conforming to our will because it is our will, or as a consequence of our choices or 
actions: “[t]here are many benefits I get which I do not literally succeed in getting” 
(Cohen 1994: 23). Given this, Cohen insists that theorists of distributive justice should 
be concerned with how good individuals’ lives actually are, as well as whether they 
have the opportunity to lead a good life: “[s]urely what matters, normatively, is 
whether individuals are living well” not just whether they can (Richardson 2000: 318 
(my emphasis)).1 Cohen suggests that capability theorists can only incorporate a 
concern for these passively-achieved benefits if possessing a capability is no longer 
taken to entail that we are free to achieve a benefit for ourselves.  
 
Cohen, therefore, contends that capability theorists must choose between an 
implausibly athletic definition of well-being (wherein we are only benefitted by 
outcomes we achieve ourselves), and an implausibly weak or expansive reading of 
freedom (wherein freedom does not require that we control outcomes). Previous 
responses to Cohen have defended the capability approach by grasping the latter horn, 
                                                        
1 Whilst some authors (for example, Richardson (2000), Arneson (2000), Fleurbaey (2006)) argue that 
our focus should be functionings rather than capabilities, Cohen suggests that that our focus should be 
functionings as well as capabilities. It is important both that individuals can live well, and that they do.  
2 
 
and insisting that an unathletic interpretation of freedom in the capability approach is 
not implausible.2 Yet, I argue, capability theorists need not face this dichotomy: they 
can maintain both that freedom requires control, and that passively-achieved benefits 
may improve an individual’s well-being. This is because capabilities are not presented 
simply as components of individual well-being, but as the appropriate goal of just 
distributive policies. Freedom as control can, therefore, be defended as a policy goal, 
without implying that such freedom is constitutive of well-being.  
 
Thus, Cohen’s critique is not, as he implies, an internal one, arguing that capability 
theorists have failed to meet their own goal of properly characterising individual well-
being. Rather, it amounts to the suggestion that capability theorists have erred in 
providing an answer to the ‘equality of what?’ question that does not incorporate a 
comprehensive and accurate account of well-being, and is, instead, concerned to 
protect and promote individual autonomy and agency. I will not take a view on whether 
capability theorists should become (completely or partially) welfarists. I will, however, 
defend capabilities as a coherent metric of distributive justice, and one likely to be 
appealing to those concerned to devise policy that prioritises individual autonomy and 
avoids paternalism, rather than maximising well-being by any means. We may, as 
Cohen (1994: 124) claims, “unambivalently welcome” the world coincidentally 
conforming with our will, without similarly welcoming government action 
coincidentally ensuring such conformity, without reference to our will.  
 
I will, therefore, suggest that capability theorists should not respond to Cohen by 
abandoning an athletic understanding of freedom (as requiring control) (§2), and will 
defend prioritising such freedom in public policy (§3). Thus, I will argue that, 
understood as a guide to distributive policy, the capability approach’s focus on 
individual freedom and control is justified: in the public domain it is important not just 
that individuals receive ‘benefits’ but that they participate in their achievement. The 
‘athleticism’ of which Cohen accuses the capability approach is not an element 
capability theorists should aim to eliminate, but one they should celebrate.  
 
2. Goals of the Capability Approach: Public Policy and Non-Instrumental Freedom 
 
Sen developed the capability approach in response to perceived problems in 
development policy and so, in part, to problems in measurements of well-being and 
quality of life on which these policies were based. The capability approach, therefore, 
                                                        
2 For example, Sen (1993) and Olsaretti (2005). See §2.2 for further discussion.  
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has been, and continues to be, used as a “standard of individual advantage” or well-
being (Olsaretti 2005: 90). However, my focus here is on the capability approach as a 
response to the ‘equality of what?’ or, as Olsaretti (2005: 89) more accurately terms it, 
the “distribution of what?” question. In this role, the capability approach functions as a 
guide to policy: to the distributive outcome that governments should promote.3  
 
Understood as a theory of distributive justice, concerned with guiding policy, and 
delineating the legitimate basis of government action, the approach will not provide a 
comprehensive account of all factors that contribute to our well-being. As Nussbaum 
(2011: 32-33) puts it, its purpose is to establish the “task of government…[under] a 
decent political order”, and, if we reject welfarism, the ‘task of government’ is not 
merely the promotion of well-being. Thus, like Carter (2014, 76) “[t]he object of my 
investigation is the capability approach understood as a normative political theory…not 
merely as a non-political (or not-necessarily-political) theory of the quality of 
life…[but] as a theory that contains or entails certain political prescriptions”. It is as 
political prescriptions that capabilities, requiring freedom as control, are promoted, and 
in the political context that the focus on control is justified.  
 
2.1 Cohen’s Critique 
 
Cohen approves of much of what the capability approach sets out to achieve, and 
commends Sen for his identification of a space between resources and utility in answer 
to the ‘equality of what?’ question. Cohen accepts capability theorists’ contention that 
resourcist approaches fail to take account of individuals’ different resource needs and 
conversion capacities (ability to ‘convert’ resources into achieved functionings). 
Consequently, he agrees that we should not consider what goods or resources 
individuals possess, but what goods do for people. He also agrees with capability 
theorists that the welfarist assessment of goods, in terms of the utility they generate, 
takes too narrow a view of what goods do for people. Given this, Cohen agrees that we 
should not adopt either of these standard approaches wholesale, and should focus 
instead on the (valuable) activities or states of being that goods enable us to achieve: 
the functionings they give us the capability to perform.  
 
                                                        
3 Sen (2009; 2010) has noted the political role of the capability approach in recent work, and Nelson 
(2008: 118, fn.42), for example, suggests that though “the capability approach emerged out of an attempt 
to redefine ‘development’…Sen converted it into a claim about moral philosophy and distributive justice 
quite early on”. Sen continues to emphasise its diverse applications, however, so in considering the 
approach solely as a theory of distributive justice I am more in line with Nussbaum’s work. 
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Cohen disagrees, however, when Sen calls this space, between resources and utility, 
‘capabilities’, since this implies that what matters is what goods enable us to do for 
ourselves. Cohen (1993: 19) contends that the space Sen has identified is broader than 
the categories of either capabilities or functionings imply: “[w]hat goods do to people is 
identical neither with what people are able to do with them [their capabilities] nor with 
what they actually do with them [their achieved functionings]”. Thus, Cohen argues 
that we should not be concerned only with individuals’ capabilities.  
 
Cohen points out that goods may also provide us with passively-achieved benefits. For 
example, babies do not maintain themselves through the exercise of capabilities, but 
nonetheless get more from goods than just utility: they also experience (without 
participating in the achievement of) valuable functionings, such as nourishment or 
health. Moreover, it is not for the sake of their utility alone that we think we ought to 
provide them with these goods. Adults, too, can get benefits from goods without the 
exercise of capabilities: health from being in a malaria-free environment or from the 
rays of the sun, for example, or nourishment from a nutrient drip.  
 
Cohen (1993: 18) calls the broader category of “what goods do to (or for) human 
beings”, with or without their participation, ‘midfare’. On this view, it is not always our 
capability to achieve functionings that matters, but sometimes merely their 
achievement. Midfare, then, incorporates three valuable categories:  
(a) the substantive opportunity to perform a valuable functioning (capabilities);  
(b) a (valuable) activity or state of being (functioning), achieved:  
(i) through an individual’s activity (exercised freedom to function); or 
(ii) without their participation (passively-achieved).  
Cohen argues that this final category – passively-achieved benefits – contributes to 
individual well-being, but that Sen ignores it, being concerned only with our freedom 
and its exercise, and that, as such, his account of well-being is excessively ‘athletic’.4 
Cohen does not dispute the value of freedom and, indeed, includes it as an important 
element of midfare.5 His concern is that capability theorists wrongly insist that for a 
functioning to contribute to our well-being it is necessary that we are free to perform it, 
and that we achieve this functioning through an exercise of our freedom. 
 
                                                        
4 Under Cohen’s (1993: 28) own preferred approach – equal access to advantage – “the normative accent 
is not on capability as such, but on an agent not lacking an urgent desideratum through no fault of his 
own”, even if this achieved without the participation of the benefitted individual.  
5 Sen’s (1993: 45) criticism of midfare for failing to distinguish the fasting rich person, and the starving 
poor, therefore, seems uncharitable.  
5 
 
Cohen focuses his critique on Sen’s elaboration of the capability approach, and in 
presenting his account I have maintained this focus. However, the same points could be 
raised against any approach that considers individuals entitled to capabilities, as 
substantive opportunities to perform functionings. I will not, therefore, defend a 
particular version of the capability approach – such as Sen’s or Nussbaum’s – nor 
discuss the nuances of these approaches. I will understand the capability approach, in 
broad terms, to propose that the justice of a distribution is measured in terms of 
individuals’ access to capabilities, and that redistribution should aim to ensure such 
access.6 I aim to demonstrate that protecting and promoting the athletic freedom 
entailed by capabilities may be a plausible guide to distributive policy, and that Cohen’s 
critique should not lead us to rule out capabilities as a metric of distributive justice 
(distinct from midfare).  
 
2.2 Freedom and Choice in the Capability Approach 
 
I follow Cohen (1995: 102) in accepting that “real freedom”, or freedom “worthy of the 
name”, is “the circumstance of genuine control over one’s life” (my emphasis). I 
therefore agree that cases where the world coincidentally conforms to one’s will – Sen’s 
(1992: 64-5) notion of ‘effective freedom’, or what Cohen (1994: 120-5) calls a ‘weak’ 
reading of freedom – are not instances of freedom. I will take ‘freedom’ to mean that 
our choices (or preferences) must exert control in the world or determine an outcome: 
my choice will be satisfied because it was my choice.7 Thus, in contrast to other 
responses – such as Sen’s and Olsaretti’s, discussed below – my response to Cohen does 
not depend on insisting that he overemphasises the ‘athleticism’ of the freedom that 
capability theorists promote. I agree, then, that freedom in the capability approach 
requires control. I disagree that this gives us reason to reject this approach to 
distributive justice.  
 
                                                        
6 I take no view on the appropriate distributive principle – egalitarian, sufficientarian, prioritarian or 
other. I will primarily consider views that suggest we should have capabilities to perform specific 
valuable functionings (however identified). Such views are widely-held (by both Nussbaum and Sen, for 
example), and it is often assumed that any version of the capability approach must be so committed 
(Carter 2014; Olsaretti 2005: 94). However, I also discuss approaches that do not specify what we should 
have the capability for, since these are especially vulnerable to Cohen’s critique, given that they are 
particularly concerned with individuals’ freedom rather than the ‘benefits’ they actually achieve. 
7 I follow Philip Pettit here in arguing that it is sufficient for freedom that our preferences, not just our 
choices, be decisive. Roughly, a choice can be defined as our explicit selection of an option, and a 
preference as what we “counterfactually would have chosen” (Pettit 2010: 92). I freely achieve an 
outcome if my preference is satisfied because it is my preference, since “[my] preference is at the origin of 
a causal sequence that fixes the alternative to be realised” (Pettit 2010: 100). For example, this is so if 
someone acts to ensure I receive the medical treatment I prefer (because I prefer it) even if I am 
unconscious, and so incapable of choosing.  
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It is worth emphasising that given that my concern is with the capability approach to 
distributive justice, I need not make the strong claim that freedom per se must involve 
control. Rather, I suggest that freedom as it is understood and promoted (by capability 
theorists) as a political value, should involve control. Thus, in response to Cohen’s 
(1994: 124) contention that:  
[t]here are two values associated with the successful exercise of freedom. 
One is that the world conforms to my will and the other is that it is I who 
achieve that result. Sometimes the second value does not matter much… 
I would suggest that the second value matters a great deal in the political domain. Most 
liberal approaches aim to avoid the imposition of paternalist policies, where 
paternalism constitutes interference with an agent’s autonomous choices, motivated by 
a distrust of their ability to make decisions in their best interests and an assumption 
that the intervening agent’s judgement is superior.8 Rather, liberals aim to respect 
individuals as agents capable of formulating goals (“originators of ends” (Taylor in 
Carter 2014: 82)), and to allow them the freedom to pursue these ends, without the 
imposition of a perfectionist conception of the good. The capability approach is one 
such liberal theory, and though promoting capabilities may increase well-being, its goal 
is not to maximise well-being but to respect individuals as autonomous agents.9  
 
I will not provide an independent argument for promoting anti-paternalist public 
policy, or try to convince those unmoved by the value of individual autonomy, and the 
importance of a state allowing its free exercise.10 Rather, I will show how the liberal 
values and anti-paternalist commitments in the capability approach can be plausibly 
realised. I believe that this requires that individuals have freedom as control over their 
lives (Cohen’s ‘second value’, above). As Sen (1992: 65) notes, “it is often very hard, if 
not impossible, to have a system that gives each person all the levers of control over 
her own life”, however it is access to these ‘levers’ we should promote. I will expand on 
my understanding of freedom as control below (§2.3), before arguing that capability 
theorists’ focus on such ‘athletic’ freedom is justified, when devising distributive policy 
(§3). First, though, I will consider the problems with responding to Cohen by claiming 
                                                        
8 Defining paternalism is a complex matter, but this broad definition is relatively uncontroversial, and 
consistent with many influential accounts (e.g. Shiffrin 2000; Quong 2011). 
9 Sen may be interpreted as understanding well-being in terms of functionings and capabilities to 
function: promoting capabilities, then, may amount to promoting well-being. However, Sen also 
discusses the significance of agency as distinct from well-being: “the goals and values…[an agent] has 
reason to pursue, whether or not they are connected with her own well-being” (Sen 1992: 56). (See also 
Cudd 2014; Crocker and Robeyns 2010.) Thus, though ‘agency-freedoms’ are distinct from capabilities 
(‘well-being freedoms’), Sen would advocate policies that promoted both agency and well-being. (I will 
consider the problems with Sen’s unathletic interpretation of these freedoms below.)   
10 For arguments for the benefits of liberal, anti-paternalist public policy, see, for example, Feinberg 
(1986), Mill (1974), Quong (2011), Nussbaum (2000: 51-59).   
7 
 
that capability theorists’ focus on freedom is justified because freedom need not be 
understood athletically.  
 
In his response to Cohen, Sen (1993: 43) insists that “athleticism was never intended”, 
and Cohen was simply “misled” by words such as ‘capability’ and ‘achieving’. Indeed, 
Sen’s (1993:44) position as he presents it here seems very close to Cohen’s:  
an active exercise of freedom might well be valuable for a person’s quality of 
life and achieved well-being…[but] freedom has many aspects…and it would 
be a mistake to think of achievements only in terms of active choice by 
oneself.  
Active choice is “an important component of living freely” (Sen 1993: 44), then, but it is 
only one component, and freedom does not always need to involve such activity. In this 
way, Sen may avoid Cohen’s charges of athleticism, but Cohen seems right to point out 
that it is rather counterintuitive to say that someone’s freedom “is enhanced…when 
something he or she values occurs….even when the person had nothing to do with the 
occurrence” (Sen in Crocker and Robeyns 2010: 77). 
 
Rejecting Sen’s interpretation in favour of freedom as control will require biting the 
bullet on a point that is considered a reductio ad absurdum of using athletic freedom in 
the capability approach: that we should have control both over which functionings we 
exercise, and the circumstances in which we choose.11 Capabilities are, essentially, 
substantive opportunities, “created by a combination of personal abilities, and the 
political, social, and economic environment” (Nussbaum 2011: 20 (my emphasis)). Sen 
(2001: 54-56; 1999: xi-xii), too, emphasises the contribution of external circumstances, 
policies, and decisions to the provision of these opportunities. However, though Sen 
acknowledges the instrumental value of background conditions, he insists that having a 
capability does not depend on our ability to control these conditions (and so determine 
whether an opportunity is available to us). For example, Sen (2001: 54) does not 
distinguish between a disabled individual who has the capability “to go out of her 
house whenever she wants and to move around freely” because she “is always helped 
by volunteers with goodwill”, and one is enabled to do so by servants who “have to 
obey…her command”.12  
 
                                                        
11 “It would be implausible to insist, for example, that what we should ensure is not that malaria is 
eradicated, but that people enjoy control over whether or not there is malaria in their environment” 
(Olsaretti 2005: 93). (See also: Sen 2001: 55-56; Cohen 1994: 121.)  
12 To avoid any ethical concerns about employing servants, we could substitute machines that fulfil a 
similar role.  
8 
 
The freedom (and well-being) of the individual dependent on the goodwill of 
volunteers may indeed be increased, but this is not the freedom that a liberal, respect-
based, anti-paternalist capability approach should promote. Individuals cannot freely 
form and pursue a conception of the good if they cannot be certain that they will 
continue to have access to central capabilities (the volunteers’ goodwill may cease), 
and are not respected as agents if they must court this goodwill to maintain such 
access. Thus, non-contingent, secure freedom should be the goal of liberal public policy. 
I believe that this requires both the first-order freedom to control whether we function, 
and the second-order freedom to control which functionings are available to us (§2.3). 
Opportunities alone do contribute to individual freedom, then, but the opportunity to 
determine the nature of these opportunities also contributes, and governments have 
reason to promote both (as §3.2 will argue).  
 
Serena Olsaretti also responds to Cohen by insisting that freedom in the capability 
approach is not athletic. Her argument runs, briefly, as follows: the endorsement of 
valuable functionings is necessary for well-being; endorsement is best secured when 
people choose freely which functionings to achieve; and people are better placed to 
choose freely when they also have the freedom to forgo functionings (Olsaretti 2005: 
98-100). I believe Olsaretti’s response moves in the wrong direction in two ways. First, 
capabilities, on her view, have merely instrumental (and so contingent) value as a 
means to ensuring individuals endorse valuable functionings. Second, Olsaretti insists 
that providing these capabilities does not involve an athletic (or, in Olsaretti’s (2005: 
100) words, “hyperactive”) notion of freedom. Endorsement is not understood in a 
strong sense, involving active choice or control, but is merely taken to mean that “the 
functioning is not forced on me” (Olsaretti 2005: 100). This thin definition of 
endorsement may include instances when a person’s will is bypassed, such as cases of 
brainwashing, indoctrination, or hypnosis (Olsaretti 2005: 103-104). 
 
Both these elements are incompatible with the central concerns of the capability 
approach to protect individual freedom, and avoid paternalism. For many capability 
theorists, including both Sen and Nussbaum, freedom has intrinsic, not merely 
instrumental, value.13 Capabilities are not promoted as the best means to ensure all 
individuals perform valuable functionings, but because “a focus on dignity will dictate 
policy choices that protect and support agency” (Nussbaum 2011: 30). Olsaretti’s 
instrumental approach also means the justification for promoting capabilities depends 
on there being a stable causal connection between providing individuals with 
                                                        
13 For example, Nussbaum 2011: 198; Sen 1993: 39.  
9 
 
capabilities, and their endorsing valuable functionings. Given Olsaretti’s weak 
definition of endorsement, it seems likely that this causal connection often will not 
hold. This makes the toleration of individuals pursuing various conceptions of the good, 
and a variety of functionings, rather tenuous. If a superior means were found to make 
people endorse the ‘right’ choice, and perform ‘valuable’ functionings (more effective 
brainwashing techniques?), such toleration would no longer be necessary.14 
 
Thus, Olsaretti’s abandonment of an athletic understanding of freedom, in favour of a 
more minimal interpretation (as ‘not being forced’), and instrumental construal of the 
value of freedom, means individuals’ autonomous choices are only contingently, and so 
not securely, protected. Similarly, Sen’s lack of concern with how opportunities are 
established does not securely protect capabilities, or individuals’ ability to form and 
pursue a conception of the good, free from dependency on the goodwill of others. In 
defending an approach, it is preferable to uphold its central motivating concerns, rather 
than abandoning them, and an unathletic conception of freedom is a poor base from 
which to pursue the liberal and anti-paternalist goals endorsed by many capability 
theorists. I will argue that it is possible to defend a version of the capability approach 
that considers athletic freedom (as control) as of intrinsic importance, and which can, 
therefore, avoid paternalism, and respect individuals’ autonomy and agency.  
 
2.3 (Political) Freedom as Control 
 
Yet two challenges remain. First, more needs to be said about what it means to have 
freedom as control. Second, it should be explained why what seems attractive in 
Cohen’s criticism – that sometimes passively-achieved benefits are worth pursuing, 
regardless of the affected individuals’ preferences – is not, in fact, compelling. I will 
begin my response to the first challenge here, outlining what it means for individuals to 
have control. The following section will continue this response, considering the sense 
in which individuals can be said to have control in ‘group’ cases (§3.2), as well as taking 
up the second challenge, arguing for the plausibility of the focus on such athletic 
freedom in the political domain (§3.1; §3.3).  
 
                                                        
14 Olsaretti (2005: 104-106) considers the objection that the connection between endorsement and 
freedom may merely be contingent, especially since endorsement as she defines it is sometimes best 
achieved using force. Yet her response – that “we lack the information necessary for identifying the cases 
in which endorsement could, in the long term, be obtained through force” (Olsaretti 2005: 106) – will be 
unsatisfactory to an anti-paternalist, who want policies that in principle rule out such interference. It is 
scant protection against paternalism that we do not currently have the information necessary to be 
effective paternalists (as Carter (2014: 87) also notes).  
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Simply put, I understand freedom as control to require that our preferences or choices, 
made in a procedurally appropriate way, should determine outcomes independently of 
their content and context. Each of these three elements – appropriate procedure, 
content, and context – require some elucidation. First, then, I suggest that our choices 
should be made under procedural conditions, such that ‘endorsement’ means 
something more substantive than Olsaretti’s use of the term, according to which 
endorsement is mere assent in the absence of force. Instead, I mean something more 
akin to Nussbaum’s practical reason, with its emphasis on being able to plan one’s life, 
and “engage in critical reflection” about that plan (Nussbaum 2000: 79). Thus, we 
should require that our choices meet something like Feinberg’s (1986: 104-106) 
conditions of voluntary choice: they should be formed without coercion, with 
knowledge of the relevant empirical facts, in a clear emotional state, not based on 
mistaken reasoning, and be carefully considered. 
 
Requiring procedural prerequisites for free choice fits with Pettit’s (2007) suggestion 
that freedom requires that individuals’ choices are decisive independently of their 
content and context. Content-independence means that an individual’s choice should 
be decisive regardless of what they choose: for example, whether or not an individual 
chooses to perform a valuable functioning. This fits with my suggestion that choice 
should not (and in many iterations does not) have a merely instrumental role in the 
capability approach: capabilities are not merely a means to ensuring individuals make 
the ‘right’ choices. For an individual to have the capability for nourishment, then, they 
must be able to choose both to be nourished and to fast; to have the capability for 
health they must be able to choose to be healthy or unhealthy.  
 
Context, favour, or permit-independence requires that the decisiveness of our 
preferences, or our ability to control an outcome, should not depend on the ‘gratuitous 
favour’ of a third party.15 Thus, we are not free if our preferences are decisive only 
insofar as we retain the favour of some other(s). This would rule out our possessing 
capabilities under a dictatorship, however benevolent. Pettit (2007: 13-15) gives an 
example of a benevolent potentate who uses his wealth to improve the healthcare and 
education systems of his country. As long as our access to these benefits depends on his 
favour, we do not possess the capability for health or education. Even if, for as long as 
his favour lasts, we can achieve these functionings, we lack these capabilities since we 
                                                        
15 Pettit (2010: 98-99) now refers to permit, rather than context, independence, as will I, since this better 
captures the significant feature of our context (the permission of a third-party).  
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lack effective control over whether we are able to function.16 The significance of 
permit-independence is particularly clear in collective action cases, as §3.2 will discuss.   
 
I suggest that possessing a capability requires that these three conditions be met. This 
is certainly an athletic form of freedom, in Cohen’s sense, but not, I will argue, 
implausibly so. It is worth reiterating that I am not claiming that this interpretation is 
true of every version of the capability approach (to distributive justice), though I do 
believe that it captures the motivating concerns of many prominent versions. Instead, I 
propose that for those concerned to avoid paternalism in the implementation of public 
policy, rather than the achievement of individual well-being by any means, this view 
will have some appeal.17 Promoting athletic capabilities is a coherent goal, and a 
defensible response to the ‘equality of what?’ question, and does not merely signal a 
failure to acknowledge an important component of well-being.  
 
3. In Defence of Athletic Freedom 
 
Why is it so important that the government ensures we have control over our 
environment, rather than simply promoting our well-being, even if our own role in its 
achievement is a passive one? To answer, I will focus on the passively-achieved benefits 
that most concern Cohen: ‘freedoms-from’ environmental obstacles, in particular the 
freedom from diseases such as malaria. Freedom from malaria seems like a prime 
example of something the government ought to promote regardless of our choices or 
preferences, and even if we do not play an active role in achieving this benefit. Yet, 
Cohen objects, capability theorists cannot acknowledge the value of such passively-
achieved benefits. Moreover, the ‘freedom-from’ such a harm or burden removes an 
available option or limits our capabilities (to be subject to that harm), which may 
appear contrary to the aims of the capability approach.  
 
I will argue that valuing the freedom-from some environmental obstacles is compatible 
with the capability approach, but that they should not be unilaterally promoted by 
governments (§3.1). Instead, in cases where a group is necessarily affected by a policy, 
the group should decide whether the policy – such as the eradication of malaria – will 
be pursued (§3.2). In such collective action cases, individuals simply cannot have direct 
                                                        
16 As discussed (§2.2), Sen (2001: 54-56) rejects the suggestion that possessing capabilities requires that 
our ability to function is independent of the permission or goodwill of a third-party. However, I contend 
that as a guide to policy permit-independent capabilities should be our goal.  
17 For those committed to a preference-independent account of well-being – such as Arneson in recent 
work (e.g. 2010) – the idea that we should give individuals control, even when they will ‘misuse’ it by 
giving up valuable options, will never be plausible. My goal is not to convince them otherwise.  
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control, since this would undermine others’ freedom. Thus, having freedom as control 
may merely require participation in a democratic system: the possession of ‘collective 
capabilities’. These collective capabilities ensure that individual agency is respected, 
and paternalism is avoided, in cases where individual capabilities cannot be provided 
(§3.3). I will, therefore, demonstrate that Cohen is wrong to suggest that capability 
theorists must choose between a plausible reading of freedom (as control), and 
properly conceptualising well-being.  
 
3.1 Freedoms-from and Capabilities  
 
To undermine the plausibility of capability theorists’ concentration on freedom, Cohen 
considers cases where benefits are achieved passively. In particular, when we are 
benefitted by being made free from a risk or obstacle “that impede[s our]…achievement 
of valuable functionings in choice-insensitive ways” (Olsaretti 2005: 94). For example:  
a malaria-ridden environment…render[s] the functioning of being…disease-
free highly difficult or impossible, and…[does] so, typically, in choice-
insensitive ways, in the sense that someone exposed to these factors is likely 
to come to lack the relevant functioning through no choice of her own (ibid.).  
Cohen insists that since capability theorists aim to provide individuals with freedom as 
control they cannot promote such freedoms-from obstacles (since this would provide 
functionings rather than the capability to function). Whilst they may enhance our 
freedom, they are not freedoms in themselves, and so not the direct concern of the 
capability approach. As Olsaretti (2005: 93) presents Cohen’s view:  
‘Freedom from malaria’ only counts as a capability on an unduly expansive 
sense of freedom, one on which someone’s freedom is enhanced when 
something happens to her or her environment, even though she has not 
chosen that thing and has no control over whether that thing will be chosen.  
Whilst Olsaretti’s (2005: 95-96) (and Sen’s (1993; 2001)) response is to defend this 
‘expansive’ and unathletic view of freedom, I follow Cohen in agreeing that freedom 
does require control, and that ‘freedom from malaria’ cannot plausibly be understood 
as a capability.18 Nonetheless, the response capability theorists can make initially 
                                                        
18 It is worth noting that ‘freedom from malaria’, understood as living in a malaria-free environment, 
does not necessarily remove all individual choice. If our environment is just our particular locality, then 
someone could retain the opportunity to contract malaria if they had the resources to travel somewhere 
that is not malaria-free. Moreover, being in a ‘malaria-ridden environment’ only makes the functioning of 
being disease-free ‘highly difficult or impossible’ if we lack access to anti-malarial drugs and mosquito 
nets. It is possible, then, to have capabilities – control over our functioning – in either environment, and 
Cohen and Olsaretti oversimplify matters by assuming that our environment will straightforwardly 
determine our functioning achievement. Nonetheless, I will also assume here that these environmental 
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seems remarkably straightforward: they need not consider freedoms-from to be 
capabilities in order to promote them.  
 
The capability approach aims to provide freedom in the sense of substantive 
opportunities, which include the physical and psychological conditions of making a 
choice. This seems likely to include the removal of obstacles that prevent people from 
making choices: we cannot have a secure capability for good health whilst living in a 
malarial environment, for example. As well as securing new opportunities, freedoms-
from may also improve our ability to choose between available options. For example, 
being free from starvation may allow us to choose to leave a job we hate, if the 
consequences of doing so are no longer so dire (starvation). Further, the decision to 
exercise some functionings, once free from the obstacles to performing them, may also 
increase our ability to choose. For example, being nourished may improve our brain 
functioning, as well as removing the distraction of perpetual hunger, and so give us a 
greater capacity for reasoning and decision-making than if we were malnourished.19 
 
Thus, capability theorists have many reasons to value and, indeed, promote freedoms-
from as a means to promoting capabilities, without having to concede that freedoms-
from are, themselves, capabilities. Given that many policies that enhance some 
capabilities also restrict others, an instrumental argument of this sort might require us 
to make trade-offs between different capabilities. In some cases, this will only mean the 
loss of opportunities widely considered disvaluable (for example, contracting malaria) 
for the sake of valuable, or central, capabilities (the opportunity for good health). For 
most capability theorists (who rely on a list of specified valuable functionings) this 
would barely be considered a trade-off at all, since nothing they value is lost. Even 
where the lost capability is one they consider valuable, giving it up may be justified 
where another valuable capability can be achieved by doing so. This is a familiar 
enough phenomenon: people choose to get sterilised (to be ‘free-from fertility’), and 
thus lose the opportunity to control whether they have children, in order to have other 
options. The control over our lives that a capability gives us does not require that this 
control be always maintained. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
changes do affect individual functionings in the choice-insensitive way Cohen and Olsaretti describe: 
individuals will lack the capability to be disease-free in a malaria-ridden environment, and lack the 
capability to contract malaria in a malaria-free one. This is what this example is intended to show, and in 
actually existing situations of scarcity, this will be the case. Further, even if we grant Cohen that such 
environmental changes are not capabilities, his critique still lacks bite, as I will show. Thanks to Fabienne 
Peter for pressing me on this point.  
19 Olsaretti (2005: 95-96) presents a similar argument.  
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The capability approach, then, does not proscribe decisions that limit our future option 
sets, or future opportunities to control our lives. It does, however, proscribe such 
limitation of options without the consultation of the affected individual. Sterilisation is 
acceptable if chosen by the person to be sterilised, but unacceptable if it were the result 
of a government policy concerning population control. Responding to Cohen’s cases is 
complicated by the fact that these tend to concern public, non-excludable goods, 
wherein making us free from an obstacle will limit the future options of many people. I 
will suggest (in §3.2) that individuals should have control over their shared 
environment, as well as control over the more specific functionings they perform. 
Further, that when a group is affected by these environmental changes, it is the affected 
group who should exercise control (since individual control is impossible).  
 
Before analysing freedom as control in collective cases, however, it is worth 
considering how capability theorists not committed to providing capabilities for 
specific valuable functionings should respond to Cohen’s critique. On such a view, 
though we identify specific valuable capabilities (for example, for health), these are 
interpreted as domains of control, rather than the ability to perform a specific 
functioning (being healthy). Thus, this view would not distinguish ‘valuable’ 
functionings – such as controlling our reproduction – from ‘disvaluable’ functionings – 
such as contracting malaria. We should have control over all aspects of our health. It 
would, therefore, be problematic if individuals were forcibly denied the opportunity to 
contract malaria, just as it would be if they were forcibly denied the opportunity to 
have children. In both cases, we should be able to control both whether we have these 
opportunities, and the use we make of them.  
 
I believe this approach captures the capability approach’s underlying liberal goals: that 
individuals be enabled to autonomously form and pursue their own conception of the 
good, and that respect for human dignity requires that we allow individuals to exercise 
their agency. It also better encapsulates Pettit’s suggestion that freedom be content- 
independent, and provides a response to Carter’s claim that an identifiable capability 
approach cannot provide content-independent freedom, and so avoid paternalism.20 
However, whether or not this approach seems plausible,21 it is worth considering since 
                                                        
20 This does not, as Carter (2014: 94-97) suggests, amount to a concern for ‘capability as such’, which 
may collapse into welfarism (giving people what they most want), or resourcism (giving individuals a 
bundle of resources to use them as they wish). I agree with Carter that anti-paternalism requires the 
promotion of non-specific freedom, but this does not mean that we are equally entitled to all freedoms. 
We should not tell individuals what use to make of their capability to control their health, but we should 
provide them with this capability, rather than the capability to go to the Fun House (Anderson 1999: 
332) or to buy a Stradivarius (Dworkin 2000: 61).  
21 I provide a more complete defence of this view elsewhere (Begon unpublished).  
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it is especially vulnerable to Cohen’s criticisms, given that it requires that individuals be 
in control in a greater range of cases (even when all that is lost is an apparently 
disvaluable opportunity). To defend even this ‘excessive’ athleticism seems the best 
way to show that Cohen’s concerns about athleticism are misplaced. 
 
3.2 Collective Capabilities and Democracy 
 
I have suggested that the capability approach should provide individuals with freedom, 
in the sense of the ability to exercise control over central domains of their life, not 
simply to ensure that we get what we want in these domains (or what some capability 
theorists consider good for people), but to ensure we are treated in an appropriate 
(non-paternalistic) way: our agency is respected. Not getting what we most want may 
be detrimental to our well-being, but it need not be paternalist. Enforced sterilisation, 
then, is not just problematic because some individuals lose a valued opportunity (to 
have children), which may decrease their well-being. More importantly, overriding 
individuals’ preferences insults their agency in a characteristically paternalist way, by 
distrusting their ability to make decisions in their own best interests. To reiterate, then, 
a capability approach to distributive justice is not designed to ensure that individual 
well-being is maximised, but to allow them freedom as control over their lives. I will 
now consider what it means to have such freedom in collective cases.  
 
My proposal is that just as an individual should not be denied an opportunity without 
consultation, neither should a group. As discussed, capability theorists do not prohibit 
individuals from sacrificing opportunities, but they must autonomously choose this 
sacrifice.22 Hence, just as sterilisation should not be forced on an individual, so public 
health policies should not be unilaterally imposed on a group: an individual should not 
be forcibly made ‘free-from fertility’, and a group should not have their environment 
forcibly made ‘free-from malaria’. If a concern for losing disvaluable options seems 
implausible, we can consider cases in which valuable opportunities are sacrificed. For 
example, the industrialisation of a landscape that provides much-needed jobs only at 
the expense of preventing individuals from “being able to live with concern for and in 
relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature”23. Here, the alteration of the 
                                                        
22 Some capability theorists occasionally seem willing to prevent individuals giving up what they 
consider valuable opportunities. For example, Nussbaum’s (1999: 118-129) insistence that women 
should not be allowed to sacrifice their capability for sexual satisfaction by undergoing female genital 
cutting. This is inconsistent with the anti-paternalist and political liberal commitments that motivate her 
approach, however, (for further discussion, see Chambers 2008: 159-202).  
23 This is Nussbaum’s (2000: 80) eighth central capability.  
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environment, creating the background conditions for some members of a group to have 
central capabilities, will also lead to (at least some) others losing a central capability.  
 
This loss of capability is legitimate only if the group controls whether the policy is 
implemented, where ‘control’ will mean all individuals’ preferences are counted 
equally in the democratic process. (Though protection of individual capabilities will 
mean such democratic control is not appropriate in every case (as §3.3 will discuss).) 
Indeed, I would suggest that groups should have control even when the capability lost 
is disvaluable: there should be democratic control over the introduction of both anti-
malarial, and urban planning, programmes. This is because, for capability theorists, the 
relevant problem with the undemocratic introduction of such policies is not that some 
people lose a desired (or ‘valuable’) opportunity, but that they are not respected as 
agents capable of choice.  
 
To elucidate this idea of collective control, it is useful to further consider the role of 
permit-independence. I have argued (contrary to Sen) that, when used as a guide to 
policy, the capability approach should incorporate a concern for permit-independent 
freedom, as Pettit suggests. However, I suggest that it is not enough to focus, as Pettit 
does, only on first-order, and not second-order, freedom as control. To illustrate this 
point, imagine two benevolent potentates. The first sets up a social infrastructure, such 
as a system of healthcare and education, but once set in motion, he no longer exerts 
control over its running, and so access to it is not dependent on his whims. Imagine, for 
example, that he formally relinquishes control over its operation to an independent 
body over which he has no influence. The second is as Pettit describes: he continues to 
control who has access to health and education (even if this power is never exercised).  
 
On Pettit’s view we are free when we are not being dominated, and are not liable to 
domination, so Pettit would consider the individuals in the first society free, since the 
potentate lacks the power to dominate them. Their capabilities for health and 
education are permit-independent: not reliant on the favour of a third-party. Yet, whilst 
they do have the individual capabilities for health and education, they lack control over 
the establishment of these conditions, and so lack freedom in an important sense. Just 
as it would not be unsatisfactory for a disabled person’s capability for mobility to be 
dependent on the goodwill of others, so would it be unsatisfactory for a population’s 
access to a health service to depend on the benevolence of their dictatorial government. 
Hence my suggestion that when a group is affected by a policy, it is the group who 
should control whether this policy is implemented.  
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Whilst citizens of a dictatorship lack such control, as citizens of a democratic state our 
preferences can be said to be sufficiently decisive. As Pettit (2007: 18) notes, “[a] 
democratic government is passively forced to respect what are assumed to be my 
preferences or the preferences that we in a certain group – perhaps the citizenry as a 
whole – share”.  Thus, even if citizens do not have direct control over policy, their 
preferences as a group determine the shape policy takes (or should do).24 Freedom as 
control therefore requires that when only an individual is affected, their preference 
alone should control the outcome; and when a group is affected, the group should have 
control. This is largely for the simple reason that it would be impossible to allow any 
other sort of control in group cases: to allow one individual’s choices or preferences to 
be decisive would remove control entirely from other individuals. The ability of groups 
to exert control over policy implementation will be called collective capabilities.25  
 
A natural worry is that such collective freedom to control government policy gives each 
individual very little ‘real’ control over determining what the outcome will be. 
However, as discussed, the value of control is not to ensure we get the outcome most 
conducive to our well-being (or the outcome we would, individually, prefer), but that 
we are treated appropriately (respected). Remember that an act is paternalist if it is 
motivated by a distrust of individuals’ choices, and disrespect of their agency. To be in 
the minority in a democratic vote is not to be subject to a paternalistic insult when the 
government acts on the majority decision. In contrast, when the government acts on 
what it considers the good of the majority, without taking account of anyone’s 
decisions, all citizens are insulted, even those who would have supported the policy if 
they were given the chance.26 Avoiding paternalism, and ensuring individuals have 
freedom as control, does not require that no individuals’ desires are ever frustrated, but 
                                                        
24 This is similar to Crocker and Robeyn’s (2010: 78) ‘indirect agency’, where an individual exercises 
agency even if they only play “a minor role in the causal chain”, which may include “communicating with 
appropriate officials” if this is efficacious. This approach need not imply that direct democracy is 
appropriate for every government decision. There are many areas – the minutiae of healthcare policies, 
for example – that we lack the time and expertise to engage with effectively. Yet even if governments 
make some unilateral decisions regarding specific policies, citizens should still be consulted regarding 
general policy direction.  
25 The idea of collective capabilities used here should be distinguished from another conception of 
collective capabilities, sometimes called ‘group capabilities’ (e.g. Ibrahim 2011: Alkire 2008; Stewart 
2006). This term is used to capture the importance of groups in enabling individuals to achieve valuable 
capabilities: “the newly generated functioning bundles a person obtains by virtue of his/her engagement 
in a collectivity that help her/him achieve the life he/she has reason to value” (Ibrahim 2011: 398). I do 
not doubt the importance of collective capabilities in this sense, but my focus here is on the role of 
groups in making decisions which determine the capabilities available to individuals, and not on 
capabilities that are only available in particular social contexts.  
26 It is generally considered paternalistic both to act on someone’s behalf, without allowing them to make 
a choice, and to override a choice they have made (e.g. Shiffrin 2000: 214; Groll 2012: 697-698).  
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that their preferences are respected. I contend that individuals’ preferences are 
respected when they are all given equal weight and value.27  
 
3.3 The Limits of Collective Decision-Making 
 
However, such collective decision-making is clearly not appropriate (or appropriately 
respectful) in every case. I will, therefore, provide a sketch of the kinds of decisions that 
should be made collectively. Collective decisions establish background environmental 
conditions, which determine individuals’ option sets – whether a health service, a 
disease, or a job is available – and individuals retain the individual capability to 
determine which of the available options they utilise. There will always be a tension, 
then, between individual and collective capabilities, so it is important to consider the 
extent of the restrictions a group can impose on its members. 
 
It may be helpful to begin with an example of a capability with both collective and 
individual elements, such as health. There are numerous health policies that affect all 
individuals, such as the availability of certain drugs or the establishment of a public 
health service. In many such cases, collective capabilities are appropriate, and decisions 
should be made by all individuals, counted as equals. Consequently, not all individuals 
will get their ideal option set: for example, libertarians may be compelled to contribute 
to a public health service. However, though individuals are not guaranteed their 
preferred option, freedom as control requires that individuals are, as far as possible, 
provided with a range of options.28   
 
For example, compare two vaccinations against serious, but rarely life-threating, 
diseases; both of which require a high proportion of the population to be immunised to 
be effective. In the first case, the vaccine has no side-effects, whilst in the second it will 
cause infertility in a reasonably large number of cases (say, half). A collective decision 
to adopt a compulsory programme of vaccinations in the first case seems permissible. 
Although it will deprive individuals of the capability to contract the particular disease, 
and slightly lessens their control over their healthcare, they still retain general control 
                                                        
27 It may be objected that some preferences do have more value than others, so should not be counted 
equally: for example, my choice to be healthy over your choice to smoke in public. However, this can be 
conceded without paternalism: we can take the choice of anyone regarding their health to have special 
value, without suggesting anyone’s choices are worth less. This is accommodated by understanding the 
capability approach as an account of distributive justice, in which some domains of control (like health) 
are the concern of justice, whilst others (like choosing where to smoke) are not. (See fn.20.) 
28 What constitutes an appropriate range is a complex question, and I will not attempt to specify an 
answer. However, I broadly accept Olsaretti’s (2004: 119-21) contention that voluntary choice usually 
requires that we have acceptable alternatives. I would, however, dispute the degree to which the 
standard of acceptability should be objective, especially when making decisions regarding public policy.   
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over their health. Compulsory immunisation is unlikely to be permissible in the second 
case, however, since this completely removes some individuals’ control over a central 
domain (their “choice in matters of reproduction” (Nussbaum 2000: 78)).  
 
There will, of course, be many difficult cases: if the disease was life-threatening, could 
we compel individuals to have the second vaccine?29 How high would the risk of 
becoming infertile have to be before forcing us to have the vaccine is impermissible? 
Could we expect those with certain religious views, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, to 
receive even the first vaccine? More generally, then, who constitutes the relevant 
collective for a collective capability, and what decisions can they make for other 
members of that collective?  
 
Drawing strict lines here will be difficult, but the intention is that: (a) those who are 
affected should constitute the relevant group; (b) decisions should be made by a 
collective only in cases when a group is necessarily affected; and (c) an effort should be 
made for individuals to retain a space to exercise control over central domains of their 
lives. These criteria limit the scope of collective capabilities, and prevent a majority 
decision from unacceptably limiting the freedom of the minority. For example, a policy 
of forced sterilisation would be illegitimate because: individuals outside the affected 
group would exert control over those within it (violating (a)); it is unlikely that this is a 
decision that must be placed in the hands of a group (violating (b)); and it clearly and 
severely limits the capacity to choose of the individuals affected (violating (c)).  
 
Defending the capability approach does not require that all these complex issues be 
resolved. It is enough to outline how the protection and promotion of ‘athletic’ freedom 
in public policy may be plausible, and show that this does not commit capability 
theorists to a similarly ‘athletic’ reading of well-being. I suggest, then, that capability 
theorists should provide individuals with collective control over the external 
conditions that affect groups of which they are a member, and individual control over 
which specific functionings they perform, given these external conditions. For example, 
a group may decide that a drug is made available, but individuals decide whether they 
want to take it; a group decides whether a public health service should exist, and an 
individual decides whether they use it.30 This may not always maximise individual 
well-being, but for capability theorists this is not the goal of distributive policy. It does 
                                                        
29 Of course, if the disease is not contagious individuals should never be compelled to have the vaccine, 
however life-threatening the disease.  
30 Arguably, it would not be a legitimate exercise of collective capabilities to have no public health service 
since this is likely to violate (at least) condition (c): lack of access to healthcare will severely limit 
individuals’ ability to exercise control over many important domains of their life.  
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respect individual agency and autonomy, and allow individuals the athletic freedom to 
control the environment in which they live, the options they face, and the use they 
make of them. Such ‘athletic policies’ should not be avoided.31  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Cohen insists that the capability approach must choose between an implausibly weak 
definition of freedom (according to which we are ‘free’ even when we have no capacity 
for control), or an implausibly athletic account of well-being (wherein something is 
only good for us if we achieve it for ourselves). This is a false dichotomy. When the 
capability approach is understood as a guide to just distributive policy, it can adopt a 
plausible understanding of freedom (as control) without denying that when the world 
coincidentally conforms to our will this may improve our well-being. Public policy 
should not aim simply to maximise individual well-being, however, but should aim to 
protect and promote individual autonomy, treat individuals with appropriate respect, 
and avoid paternalism. This, anyway, is the goal of the capability approach, and why 
many find it a convincing answer to the ‘equality of what?’ question. Cohen may object 
that our answer to this question should give greater prominence to well-being, but he 
has not shown that the capability approach is internally incoherent. For those who 
consider the promotion of autonomy a more central concern of justice than always 
protecting well-being, then, the approach will remain appealing. Thus, to the suggestion 
that their understanding of freedom is excessively athletic, capability theorists should 
respond that it is proudly so: government policy should aim to provide people with 
athletic freedom as control over decisions in central parts of their lives.  
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